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Book Reviews 
178), typothesis (p. 296)-but a few are sure to confuse students. For 
example, when referring to the Marxian profit rate, the expression is 
written as "s/c + v" (p. 163) not "s/(c + v)" as it should be. Some non- 
standard notation is used as well. When a mathematical expression is 
first written, a period was occasionaIIy placed between symbols to rep- 
resent multiplication; that is, "a.bW stood for "a" times "b." This is par- 
ticularly troublesome when, as on page 75, the period happens to fall 
at the end of a line. Mathematicians would prefer either a dot-"a&"- 
or nothing at all, simple "ab." This is not to say the mathematics is 
cumbersome or excessive; it is not. Kalecki used mathematics much 
more than Keynes or Marx, and a review of his work cannot ignore 
mathematics altogether, but this reader would have preferred fewer 
mathematical stumbling blocks. 
The Economics o f ~ i c h a l  Kalecki is a good introduction to the work 
of the economist some called the greatest economist in the world. It 
should be essential reading in post Keynesian and neoinstitutionalist 
macroeconomics. Kalecki's work on oligopoly pricing, the source of 
capitalist instability, and planning criteria will help as we devise new 
policies in the future. Unfortunately, the people who could benefit the 
most from studying Kalecki-new classicals, monetarists, and neoclas- 
sicals of all persuasions-are likely to ignore this book. They may want 
to pick it up after the next recession. The big one. 
WILLIAM S. BROWN 
University of Puget Sound 
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MANAGING MACROECONOMIC POLICY: THE JOHNSON 
PRESIDENCY. By James E. Anderson and Jared E. Hazelton, Univer- 
sity of Texas Press, 1986. Pp. 285. 
The emergence of active countercyclical stabi1izatio.n policies in the 
1960s presented politicians with the problem of formulating economi- 
cally desirable policies that were politically feasible as well. Economists 
have traditionally concerned themselves with the technical aspects of 
stabilization policy, leaving the analysis of actual policy formation to 
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political scientists. James Anderson and Jared Hazelton, in Managing 
Macroeconomic Policy: The Johnson Presidency, present us with an 
analysis of macroeconomic policy in the Johnson presidency that 
bridges this gap by attempting to determine how the "intermixture of 
economic and political considerations shaped and limited the actions 
of those involved in the development and administration of macroeco- 
nomic policy" (p. 42). 
In so doing, Anderson and Hazelton provide us with an interesting 
account of the evolution of major policy decisions in the areas of fiscal 
and monetry policy, incomes policy, and foreign economic policy. 
They remind us that policy recommendations are the result of a collec- 
tive, developmental process and reflect not only the ideological prefer- 
ences of the president, but also the political realities constraining 
economic policy. They alert us to the difficulties of coordinating mon- 
etary and fiscal policies in an institutional environment where the Fed- 
eral Reserve has at least a certain degree of independence. They go 
beyond the analysis of traditional stabilization policy to demonstrate 
how the Johnson administration utilized other "non-traditional tools" 
to attain desired economic targets. Furthermore, they demonstrate how 
policy actions may be important, not so much for their immediate eco- 
nomic impact, but as symbolic acts that serve to direct our attention 
to various economic problems. In short, their analysis contributes 
much to our understanding of the actual macroeconomic policy- 
making process. 
In their analysis of macroeconomic policy, Anderson and Hazelton 
analyze presidential decision-making by focusing on what has been 
called the economic subpresidency-the groups and individuals who 
interact directly with the president to help shape and determine eco- 
nomic policy. Recognizing that the policy recommendations of the 
president reflect a collective process, the authors carefully analyze the 
influence of various individuals in the Council of Economic Advisors 
(CEA), Bureau of the Budget (BOB), the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, 
the cabinet, the administration, and outside the governmental struc- 
ture. While focusing the analysis on the subpresidency, rather than on 
LBJ himself, no doubt leads to a less colorful narrative, it provides us 
with the useful insights into the policy formation process. 
The evolution of the 1968 surtax demonstrates how economic policy 
often reflects what is politically feasible rather than what is econom- 
ically desirable. According to the authors, the need for a general tax 
increase was recognized by Johnson's advisors as early as December 
1965. Johnson, apparently believing that Congress would not pass such 
a tax increase without asking for major cuts in the Great Society pro- 
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grams, chose instead to ask for a "bits-and-pieces" revenue act and mi- 
nor reductions in governmental spending to cool inflationary pressures. 
The formation of fiscal policy proposals is complicated by the 
uncertainty surrounding Federal Reserve policy and the tension that 
periodically exists between the Federal Reserve and the administra- 
tion. Anderson and Hazelton describe how the CEA's actions were con- 
strained by the Federal Reserve in early 1965 when it was feared that 
the Federal Reserve would move prematurely to tighten monetary pol- 
icy. They go on to demonstrate how this uncertainty and disagreement 
led to more formalized communication between the CEA and the Fed- 
eral Reserve. 
We often forget how innovative policy-makers can be in attempting 
to achieve their economic goals and targets. Anderson and Hazelton 
demonstrate how the Johnson administration used various non- 
traditional policies to keep inflation figures down. For example, the De- 
partment of Defense was encouraged not to buy steel from companies 
that had raised their prices in an effort to gain compliance with price 
guideposts, and even went so far as to switch from purchasing large 
eggs to purchasing medium eggs to reduce the inflationary impact on 
the Wholesale Price Index, since only large eggs are counted in the WPI 
(p. 162). 
Finally, the authors are to be commended for acknowledging the 
symbolic uses of economic policies. They point out that while the wage- 
price guideposts may have been rendered less effective by virtue of their 
lack of enforceability, they none the less were significant in "creating a 
degree of sensistivity on the part of the business community. . . who 
had the desire to be viewed as responsible" (p. 176). 
If this book is disappointing, it is merely because the authors have 
failed to provide us with a solid, exegetical framework in which to view 
these insights into the policy-making process. The themes of decision- 
making under uncertainty, institutional adaptation in a changing eco- 
nomic environment, and the importance of issues such as the 
perception ofjustice and equity in program administration are present, 
but are obscured by the detailed historical accounts of the evolution of 
policy. On the whole, however, this book is certainly a contribution to 
our understanding of the policy-making process and constitutes worth- 
while reading for those interested in macroeconomic policy. 
ANN MARI MAY 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
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